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I wondered when I picked up this book what Professor Dam'
would come up with as rules of the international monetary game.
Especially since I drew the assignment of drafting the sections on
monetary law for the current revision of the Restatement of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States,2 I have been anxiously looking around for sources of black-letter law-for rules, in
other words, as contrasted with factors, considerations, or illustrations. In one way, I am encouraged by reading Dam's book, since
for all his intelligence and scholarship he hasn't found the "rules"
either, at least for the period after the collapse of the Bretton
Woods par-value system in 1971. Indeed, the title of the book is
taken from a description of the world's monetary system before
1914, ascribed (like so much else in this field) to Lord Keynes.3
The game is still there, but the rules are more elusive than ever.
Even if all the principal players viewed objective facts from
the same vantage point and had a common set of priorities, it
would be enormously difficult to devise an effective body of rules
t Charles L. Denison Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
I This past summer Dam became Deputy Secretary of State. He is Harold J. and
Marion F. Green Professor of International Legal Studies (on leave of absence) at the University of Chicago Law School and at the time of his appointment was Provost of the
University.
I RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised). Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-4 were published in 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983, respectively. The sections on money will appear in Tentative Draft No. 5, scheduled for publication in Spring
1984.
3 K. DAM, THE RuLEs OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM 1 (1982).
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to govern international macroeconomic behavior. 4 Given the diversity of perceptions, goals, and points of departure-and indeed no
clear agreement even about who the players are-the effort to
fashion rules has much of the quality of Sisyphus's efforts to roll
the rock up the hill in Hades.5 Dam realizes this, and he makes
sure in his preface to warn off those who would look to him either
for the decoding of the rules of some eternal, unfathomable game
or for guidance on how to achieve particular goals. "Practical experience in the U.S. decision-making process," he writes, "has convinced me that scholarship has little to offer by way of direct advice to those who would restructure the international economic
system."' What he does undertake to offer is perspective-both a
longer historical view than most of the other recent writings on the
international monetary system,7 and a more detached view than
those who couple writing about the system with a plea for a particular solution, be it a return to gold, concentration on growth or on
the fight against inflation, resource transfers to developing countries, more authority for the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"), more regulation of the private banking system, or
whatever. Dam makes no special plea, except perhaps the inferential hope that those who count in this game-technicians and politicians-come to share the information and insight that he brings
to his subject.
I
If the book, then, is not about prescriptive rules, is it about
' By this term I mean management of interest rates and of growth and employment
policies, as well as exchange-rate management, as contrasted with tariffs, export subsidies,
and similar devices concerning international trade, about which rules are possible to design
and (within generous tolerances) to enforce.
5 Sisyphus was doomed to failure for having betrayed a secret of Zeus. The secret was
Sisyphus's suspicion that a giant eagle bearing a maiden to a nearby island was none other
than Zeus himself, and Sisyphus made the mistake of passing his suspicion on to the
maiden's distraught father Aesopus. Sisyphus got his punishment, Aesopus did not get his
daughter back, the island was named Aegina after the maiden, and the maiden's son by

Zeus became the grandfather of the great Achilles.
6 K. DAM, supra note 3, at xiii. One wonders whether Professor Dam would have put
the point just that way had he known, when he wrote the passage quoted, that he would be
selected for the number two position in the U.S. State Department in the summer of 1982,
when George Shultz succeeded Alexander Haig as Secretary of State. But perhaps such
skepticism, from a lawyer, is a healthy alternative to the self-confidence of the political
scientists turned statesmen in the Bundy/Kissinger/Brzezinski tradition.

For example, see C. CooMsS, THE ARENA OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1976); R. SOLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, 1945-1976: AN INSmER'S VIEw (1977), both reviewed by the present reviewer in Lowenfeld, Book Review, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1558 (1977).
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law in a wider sense? Are there laws of nature, like those of Boyle
and Newton and Kepler, that govern the international economic
system? Are there laws that can be discovered and formulated, but
not amended or repealed? The suggestion is an attractive one, related, I think, to the nostalgia for the "good old" gold standard, by
which the market, untouched by human hands, reflected national
achievement or indolence. But the reference is not one that
Dam-or anyone who reads his chapter on the nineteenth century-would accept. There may have been elegance to the model
developed by David Hume:8 as exports from Patria and imports to
Xandia rise, gold will flow to Patria and out of Xandia; prices and
wages will rise in Patria and fall in Xandia, until eventually
Xandia will import less and export more, Patria will export less
and import more, and the scales will once again be balanced. The
gold standard before World War I created some of the conditions
for this model, at least for those countries that were prepared to
issue only money backed by gold or in the form of gold coins of an
agreed and permanent weight. But as Dam neatly demonstrates, 9
the "Golden Age" (roughly 1850-1914) was not really an age of
gold but, the veil of myth removed, a period which knew floating
exchange rates, governmental intervention in the exchange market,
loans between central banks-in short, many of the devices that
today seem manipulative and inelegant, not to say inept. 10
The Golden Age looked good in part because it was a period
without war for the major powers and in part because Great Britain acted as the world's de facto central banker, creating liquidity
by loans and foreign investment.1 The "rules" of the game turn
out not to have been, for example, like Kepler's laws of motion:
they did not describe the inevitable nature of the international
economy, but rather prescribed actions to be taken by the central
banks of Patria and Xandia to make sure that the model worked
8 See D. Huua, Of the Balance of Trade, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY

(1963) (1st ed. n.p. 1741 & 1742). For an abridged version, see Hume, Of the Balance of
Trade, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: SELECTED READINGS 25 (R. Cooper ed. 1969).

supra note 3, at 14-40.
the benefit of the doubt to the myth makers, Dam is prepared to put the
beginning of the Golden Age at 1879, id. at 19, when the United States resumed convertibility of the dollar for gold after an interruption of almost 20 years during and after the Civil
War. On this view, as he points out, the Golden Age did not last much longer than the manmade Age of Bretton Woods. Id.
11Id. at 29-30. Dam notes several factors that permitted Britain to perform this role,
including the fact that London was the center for most of the world's commodities markets,
including the gold market, with most of the world's new gold arriving from South Africa
every Monday. Id.
9 K. DAm,
10 To give
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the way it was supposed to work. According to the rules, for example, if gold were flowing out of Xandia, its central bank was supposed to raise the discount rate to tighten the money supply and
induce a fall in prices. In fact central banks often did the opposite,
easing the money supply to
offset the effects of a system over
12
which they had no control.
II
Then came the Great War and the bad interwar years. Again
looking closely, as Dam does, one can see that there were really
several periods following the end of the War, punctuated, in Dam's
version, in 1925, when Great Britain returned to gold; 1931, when
Britain suspended payments of gold against currency; 1936, when
the French-led gold bloc collapsed; and 1939, when the Second
World War broke out. s Of course one could subdivide this period
quite differently, regarding, say, 1929 and 1933 as the critical turning points. In the minds of the men who planned for a better world
after World War II, what was remembered was that the interval
between wars lasted barely two decades, that there had been virtually no postwar financial planning during World War I, that monetary chaos in the 1920's, especially in Germany, had contributed to
the rise of Hitler, and that when the Nazis came to power they
perfected a variety of bilateral payments schemes that not only
misallocated resources but had the effect of squeezing the smaller
countries of Europe and drawing them into the German orbit.
"Never again," said the men who began as early as 1942 to work
toward a wholly different international monetary system.1 '
The story of the negotiation of what became the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, and particularly
Id. at 18.
Id. at 42-50.
1' See, for example, the statement of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Henry A. Morgenthau, at the closing session of the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference in July 1944:
[What we have achieved] is the alternative to the desperate tactics of the
past-competitive currency depreciation, excessive tariff barriers, uneconomic barter
deals, multiple currency practices and unnecessary exchange restrictions-by which
governments vainly sought to maintain employment and uphold living standards. In
the final analysis, these tactics only succeeded in contributing to world-wide depression
and even war.
12

13

1 PROCEEDINGS AND DocUMENTs OF THE UNrED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFER-

ENcE, BRETrON WOODS, N.H. JuLY 1-22, 1944, at 1118 (1948) (minutes of closing plenary

session). Professor Dam refers to a very similar statement from Morgenthau, Bretton Woods
and InternationalCooperation,23 FOREIGN APF. 182, 185 (1945). K. DAm, supra note 3, at
99.
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of the roles of Lord Keynes for the British and Harry Dexter
White for the Americans, has often been told.15 Though White represented a country that was likely to be the world's creditor and
Keynes a country expecting to be a debtor concerned primarily
about maintaining full employment, their proposals were in many
ways similar. Both accepted the need for a new international monetary institution, to be run as far as possible by professional managers, and both started from the premise that exchange rates are a
matter of international concern and should be relatively stable.
Further, both White and Keynes looked to the new institution to
oversee a code of monetary conduct, essentially to prohibit the interwar practices that now stood condemned, and both looked to
the organization to provide resources (though in very different
amounts) to countries in balance-of-payments difficulties.
Initially White and Keynes differed on the question of member countries' rights to change the par value of their currencies,
with White for international control and Keynes for freedom, and
Dam says that the outcome was a series of "artful concessions" to
the British that maintained only the "illusion of Fund preeminence and of an international legal rule."' 6 I think that this is an
overstatement, inconsistent with Dam's general view of the role
and character of law. 17 It is true that the original Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund' 8 did not expressly prohibit a change in par value without the Fund's concurrence, but
article IV, section 5(b), did say that a change in the par value of a
member's currency "may be made. . . only after consultation with
the Fund,"' 9 and article IV, section 6, said that if a member acts
despite the objection of the Fund, the member would be ineligible
to use the resources of the Fund, unless the Fund should determine otherwise.2 0 To me that is a fairly powerful sanction, and the
fact that it rarely has been exercised does not "vitiate[] the princi-

15

See, e.g., R. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY

IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE

72-80,

101-21 (3d ed. 1980); R. HARROD, THE LIFE OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 537-85 (1951); J.
HORSEFIELD, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-65, at 3-118 (1969). See also 2 A.
CHAYES, T. EHRLICH, & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 719-32 (1969); A.
LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 13-23 (1977), both of which are
designed as introductions to the subject for law students.
16 K. DAM, supra note 3, at 91.
17 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
'8 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, December 27, 1945, 60
Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter cited as Articles of Agreement].
29 Id. art. IV, § 5(b), 60 Stat. at 1404, 2 U.N.T.S. at 48.
20 Id.
art. IV, § 6, 60 Stat. at 1405, 2 U.N.T.S. at 50.
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ple of central Fund control."2 1 Dam is right in pointing out that
the requirement in article IV, section 5(a), that a change in par
value not be made "except to correct a fundamental disequilibrium,'2 2 suffered from the failure to define that term. I am not sure
that this constituted a failure of law, any more than did the failure
to define "due process" or "unreasonable searches" in the American Constitution. Both at Philadelphia and at Bretton Woods, the
Founding Fathers shifted some crucial decisions from their own
shoulders to those of their successors. If, as a result, the rule of law
is not as tight as some might have liked, I do not think this imports any loss of legitimacy for the process or for the role of law
overall. It seems to me that the remedies for member countries in
balance-of-payments difficulties-either provision of resources by
the Fund or devaluation-were fairly explicit, especially when coupled with the decision that the initiative for either step must come
from the member but be approved by the Fund. I was surprised by
Dam's description of these provisions as relegating the central legal
question to a "shadow existence, playing a role perhaps in debate
or negotiation, but ultimately no central role." 23 It seems to me
that the Bretton Woods compromise is not a departure from but
an illustration of Dam's basic definition of the role of law (with
which I agree) "not as a sovereign statement of the legal and the
illegal but rather as a set of substantive and procedural rules influ24
encing behavior and embodying understandings of the moment.
The famous question left open at Bretton Woods was whether
the resources over which the organization would preside would be
made available to countries as of right or under conditions to be
set by the Fund. Both interpretations could be derived from the
Articles of Agreement, 25 though neither wholly convincingly, especially since both Keynes, who favored unconditional drawing
rights, and White, who favored conditionality, claimed victory at
Bretton Woods. The resolution of the question, essentially in favor
of the American view, gave rise to much of the law-evolution, in
IX

K. DAm, supra note 3, at 91.

Articles of Agreement, supra note 18, art. IV, § 5(a), 60 Stat. at 1404, 2 U.N.T.S. at
48.

23K. DAm, supra note 3,
24 Id. at xiii; see also

at 91.
id. at 3-6 (discussing nature of rules and law and their

interrelation).
'5Compare Articles of Agreement, supra note 18, art. V, § 3(a) ("A member shall be
entitled to buy the currency of another member.. .") (emphasis added) with subparagraph
(i) of the same subsection ("The member ... represents that [the currency] is presently
needed for making ... payments which are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.").
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Dam's metaphor-of the quarter-century life of the Bretton Woods
regime. Yes (1946), members were "entitled to buy the currency of
another member,"2 but "authority to use the resources of the
Fund is limited to use in accordance with its purposes to give temporary assistance. '27 Yes (1948), the Fund would ordinarily accept
the representation of a member state that the currency it wished
to draw was "presently needed for making. . . payments. . . consistent with the . . .Agreement, ' 2 but "the Fund may, for good
reasons, challenge the correctness of this declaration. '29 Of course
(1952) access to the Fund "should not be denied because a member
is in difficulty, ' 30 but "[tihe Fund's attitude toward the position of
each member should turn on whether the problem to be met is of a
temporary nature and whether the policies the member will pursue
will be adequate to overcome the problem within such a period."'31
Gradually these decisions led to negotiations of the member states'
policies to support a drawing: the more the member was going into
debt to the Fund, the stricter the conditions. For the first so-called
tranche, equivalent in most cases to gold contributed by the member, there would be no real conditions: "Each member can count
on receiving the overwhelming benefit of any doubt. '32 If the member's debt to the Fund should grow, so would the scrutiny (and the
required undertakings) before the Fund's resources would be made
available. 33
Once drawing rights were made conditional, creditors of countries in potential difficulty could no longer count on those countries' access to the Fund's resources when the need became acute,
and so the reassuring aspect of the members' rights in the Fund
was weakened. The answer was to develop standby facilities, i.e.,

Id. art. V, § 3(a), 60 Stat. at 1406, 2 U.N.T.S. at 54.
IMF Executive Directors Interpretation Pursuant to Decision No. 71-2 (Sept. 26,
1946), SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 17, 17 (9th ed. 1981)

[hereinafter cited as SELECTED DECISIONS].
" IMF Executive Directors Decision No. 284-4 (Mar. 10, 1948),
supra note 27, at 35, 36 (8th ed. 1976).

SELECTED DECISIONS,

29 Id.
3O IMF Executive Directors Decision No. 102-(52/11) (Feb. 13, 1952), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 18.

31 Id.

"' Id. at 18, para. 3.

" For reasons that have always baffled me, members do not borrow resources from the
Fund, but purchase them, using their own (presumably costless) currencies, subject to an

obligation to redeem their currency with convertible currency or other reserve assets within
the period stated. Dam writes that perhaps the most important consequence of this termi-

nology is that the text of the Articles of Agreement is not easily understood, even by
financial experts or lawyers. K. DAM, supra note 3, at 107.
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arrangements whereby the conditions and the corresponding undertakings for Patria's drawings would be worked out in advance
of actual need. 4 Subsequently, as it appeared that not only Patria
and Xandia, but Great Britain and the United States, possibly
even at the same time, might want to draw on the resources of the
Fund, the Fund itself in effect took out a standby credit, through
the General Arrangements to Borrow, first established in 1962 and
kept going ever since.3 5
The historical treatment of these developments in The Rules
of the Game is nicely done, though I have to say that for me it
broke no new ground. Given his strong background in economics
and the analytical probing on the operative rules of the General
38
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") in his earlier book, I
had hoped Dam might question the standard prescription that the
IMF nearly always handed out to countries applying to the Fund
for use of its resources. Are balanced budgets, reduced credit, tight
money, limited wage increases and the like really the "rules of the
game," the Newtonian laws that would exist whether the Fund
were in the picture or not? If the answer is yes, then much of the
criticism of the Fund as unduly intervening in the setting of domestic priorities could be rejected: one would not, after all, criticize
a weather forecaster for prescribing boots and umbrellas when his
instruments showed the approach of snow or rain. But weather
forecasters these days nearly always agree. With as much discord
as there is among economists in and out of government in virtually
every nation where discord is permitted at all, I have always been
mildly skeptical of the homeopathic cure prescribed by the Fund.
On the basis of Dam's prior writings, I rather expected Professor
Dam to share my skepticism; reading this book I don't know
whether he does or not.

For a detailed and still essentially operative account, see generally J. GOLD, STAND-BY
ARRANGEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONE'ARY FUND (1970).
35 The General Arrangements to Borrow ("GAB") created a special Fund facility available to the so-called "Group of Ten" Fund members and controlled by them. It was
designed to avert Fund liquidity problems should one or more of the major states have to
draw on the Fund. See K. DAM, supra note 3, at 147-50. At their January 1983 ministerial
meeting, the Group of Ten decided to expand the GAB to permit its use for other states'
financing as well, if the Fund's resources otherwise might not be adequate. See Text of
Communiqu6 Issued by Group of 10, 12 IMF SuRv. 18, 20 (1983).
36 K. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970), reviewed by the present reviewer in 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 853 (1971).
3
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III
Dam sketches in only a few pages the final days of the Bretton
Woods system. He is less fascinated than others have been with
the shock of the United States announcing one Sunday night in
August 1971 that it was revoking its promise to redeem officiallyheld dollars for gold, refusing (at least for the time being) to fix
any par value for its currency, and imposing a tariff surcharge on
nearly all imported goods.3 7 Nor does he talk much about the extraordinary autumn of 1971, when a shaken IMF staff, a swaggering U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and the nervous leaders of
Western Europe tried to pick up the pieces and repair the system,
each looking to the others to take the painful decisions of currency
devaluation or revaluation. Whereas in his earlier book with
George Shultz, Dam had spoken of Secretary Connally as
"flash[ing] the signal in true Texas style, with both guns blazing in
the corridors of international finance,""8 here Connally is not even
mentioned, and the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971,"9
which rearranged currencies and preserved at least the fagade of a
regime of legal rules, is treated rather lightly and, indeed, some40
what legalistically.
Since it is no doubt true that the future determines the past,
Dam is probably right in devoting less attention to the period from
Camp David to Smithsonian than others have done.4 1 A decade
' For President Nixon's speech announcing these actions, see President'sRadio and
Television Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy for the United States,

7 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1168 (Aug. 15, 1971); for the implementation of the import
surcharge, see Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1971), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 1202
(1976). Four years after the event, the import surcharge was sustained by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (reversing the Customs Court) on the ground that it was authorized under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1976). United
States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975), rev'g 378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cust. Ct.
1974).
G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, EcONOMIC POLICY BEYOND THE HEADLINES 115 (1977).
39 For the text of the agreement, see 23 INT'L FIN. NEWS SuRv. 417, 421 (1971). The
Smithsonian Agreement as well as the relevant documents embodying the U.S. decision of
August 15, 1971, are reproduced in A. LoWENFELD,supra note 15, at 488-91, 621-34.
40 K. DAM, supra note 3, at 189-92.
41 In the monetary world (as contrasted to the saga of the Middle East) Camp David is
the name given to the measures announced by President Nixon on August 15, 1971, after a
weekend of decision making August 13-15 at the presidential retreat in Maryland. The
agreement of December 18-19, 1971, was not an accord of the IMF but rather of the Group
of Ten, and therefore the thinking was that the conference to record it should not take place
at the IMF headquarters but should be held close-by so that the executive directors could
quickly vote to approve the agreement. The Treasury Department did not have a room large
enough to accommodate all the participants plus translators, but Secretary Connally apparently did not want to hold the meeting at the State Department, which has conference
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later, what seemed to be high drama at the time does seem to be
just one phase in a process that was always inevitable. Still, I was
intrigued by the statement in Shultz and Dam that when Secretary
Connally's hard-headed policy (" 'The dollar is our currency but
their problem' ) began to create political fallout, Dr. Kissinger
began to take an interest43 and that "without the intervention of
Kissinger the devaluation of the dollar [in December 1971] would
almost surely have been greater, thereby obviating any need for a
further devaluation in February 1973." 44 There is no hint of that in

this book, and at least the second half of the quoted passage, one
might have thought, would call for some support in this longer and
more specialized treatment of the subject. 45 Dam is too tactful to
quote President Nixon's statement at the close of the Smithsonian
conference announcing "the conclusion of the most significant
monetary agreement in the history of the world."'46

Dam is more interested in the years that followed the Smithsonian Agreement (1972-74), when on the one hand a new group of
founding fathers tried to write new rules of the game, and on the
other hand entrenched habits, sovereign jealousies, and unforeseen
circumstances (notably the OPEC coup) combined to frustrate the
process of creation.47 Notwithstanding the basic failure of the
Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and
rooms of all sizes and shapes. Accordingly, the meeting was held at the Smithsonian Institution, a museum of science and natural history, and the agreement became known as the
Smithsonian Agreement.
42 C. CooMBs, supra note 7, at 219. Since Coombs quotes Connally without citation, I
cannot vouch for the accuracy of the quotation. See Lowenfeld, supra note 7, at 1563 n.18.
43 G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, supra note 38, at 12.
44 Id. at 116.
45 Supporting the Shultz/Dam view, Kissinger characterizes Connally as "sufficiently
Texan to relish a good scrap for its own sake," and describes his own role as urging agreement on a realignment of exchange rates "short of an all-out confrontation that would
threaten our Alliance relationships." H. KISSINGER, WHrrE HousE YEARs 957 (1979).
4" President'sRemarks Announcing a Monetary Agreement Following the Meeting at
the Smithsonian Institution, 7 WEEKLY Com'. PREs. Doc. 1670 (Dec. 18, 1971). The President continued:
I know that may seem to be an overstatement, but when we compare this agreement
with Bretton Woods, which, of course, was the last very significant agreement of this
kind, we can see how enormous this achievement has been.
[Indeed, [it is] the most significant event that has occurred in world financial
Id.

history.

47 Compare Keynes's remark in 1942 that only "'a single act of creation, made possible
by the unity of purpose and the energy of hope"' that the War engendered, could bring
about an international monetary institution. R. HARROD, supra note 15, at 551 (quoting
Keynes).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[50:380

Related Issues (the "Committee of Twenty"), I think Dam is right
to discuss the Committee's efforts in detail because of what they
reveal both about the evolution of the international monetary system in the preceding thirty years and about the possible direction
of its further development, whether by evolution or by reform.48
The reformers, spurred on by the collapse of Bretton
Woods-though not of the world economy-decided to go beyond
exchange rates and temporary aid by the IMF and to look at the
international economic system as a whole. 49 The crucial element,
introduced by the United States in 1972 under its new Secretary of
the Treasury, George Shultz, was that the balance of payments was
a zero-sum game, that one country's deficit was another country's
surplus, and that not only the deficit countries but the surplus
countries as well might be deviating from an appropriate norm.5 0
Stated in this shorthand way, the perception seems far from startling. But what first Shultz and eventually the Committee pointed
out was that the previous system, designed by Keynes and White
and elaborated in the 1950's and 1960's, put pressures to adjust
only on countries in deficit, with at least the inference (certainly
drawn by the press) that they were doing something wrong. It was
countries in deficit that had to devalue or to modify their policies
as a condition for drawings from the IMF or (if they were reservecurrency countries such as the United Kingdom and the United
States) to incur obligations of indeterminate maturity to the rest
of the world. The countries in surplus, in contrast, had no need to
go to the IMF for a drawing or standby, and the accumulation of
48 K. DAM, supra note 3, at 213. The whole treatment of the work of the Committee of
Twenty runs from page 211 to page 252. For a discussion of roughly the same subject by one
of the members of the "Bureau" of the Committee of Twenty, see R. SOLOMON, supra note
7, at 235-66. See also G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, supra note 38, at 122-31.
4, For examples of the range of the Committee of Twenty's discussions, see COMMITrEE

ON REFORM OF THE INT'L MONETARY SYS. & RELATED ISSUES (COMM. OF TwENTY), REPORT TO
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM: DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMrrTEE OF TWENTY (1974) [hereinafter cited as C-20 DOCUMENTS]. Professor Dam writes that

this brochure, which with annexes and Reports of Technical Groups runs to about 250
pages, represents a comparatively minor portion of the Committee of Twenty's documents.
K. DAM, supra note 3, at 213.
50 See IMF, SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 34, 36 (1972); Statement by Secretary Shultz to the Annual Meeting
of the InternationalMonetary Fund, 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 460, 462 (1972); see also ... and
Secretary Shultz's Reform Proposals,1 IMF SuRv. 70 (1972) (remarks of Secretary Schultz)
("Surplus countries ...

have ...

been under much less pressure to revalue their currencies

upward or to take other policy actions with a similar balance of payments effect.... [T]his
asymmetry will need to be corrected.").
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reserves was not in any way made painful for them. 51 Indeed in
some cases the international monetary rules had enabled countries
to maintain undervalued currencies, giving them both trade advantages (seen from a mercantilist point of view) and the ability to
insulate their own economies from inflation in the rest of the
world. In the popular image these countries-notably West Germany and Japan-were the good guys, the efficient, hard-working
producers, as contrasted with other countries living beyond their
means. The new perception said that was wrong: whatever the optimal slope of the curve of inflation, real growth, employment, consumption, and welfare might be, the countries to one side of it
were as much deviant as the countries on the other side.
Various task forces were commissioned to put these generalities in precise terms. One suggestion was to measure each country's
gain or loss in reserves over a given time period, or perhaps to
measure the relation of reserve changes to GNP. When a country's
reserves reached an "indicator point" (above or below the base),
one version would require the country to adjust; in another version, a meeting would be convened by the international community
to determine whether the country should adjust and to what extent.52 Adjustment might mean a new exchange rate (if stable exchange rates were being maintained); it could also mean other
changes in economic policy, including measures concerning interest
and credit, employment and social benefits, or imports and
exports.
What if a state-in particular a state that was accumulating
reserves in greater amount than the norm and had no need of international assistance-declined to adjust? At the start of the reform movement, that question appeared to be the major obstacle.
In the course of the work of the Committee of Twenty, however,
the problem was solved, but only at the technical level. A system of
increasingly painful sanctions (or "pressures" in the more diplomatic language of the Committee of Twenty) was developed, in51 The German view would regard the last statement as an overstatement, because
under Bretton Woods if a country in surplus was not prepared to raise the value of its
currency, it would have to purchase dollars with its currency, which might one day come
back to feed domestic inflation. If it did revalue, its export industries might be adversely
affected. Still, these choices did not involve the painful medicines administered to countries
in deficit. See, e.g., OECD, ToWARDS FuLL EMPLOYMENT AND PRicE STABInrY 247-49 (1977)
(the McCracken Report) (reporting German and Japanese criticism of the American
position).
52 Report of Technical Group on Indicators,in C-20 DocuMaEs,
supra note 49, at 51,
52, 64-67.
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cluding (in ascending order): (i) a tax on excess reserves; (ii) a requirement that excess reserves be deposited with the IMF without
interest; (iii) withholding of future allocations of Special Drawing
Rights, the "paper gold" that the IMF issues from time to time
and hoped to make the world's principal reserve asset; (iv) publication of a report on an errant country's external position and policies; and (v) (in extreme cases) authorization for other countries to
apply discriminatory restrictions on trade or other current transactions with the country in question. 3
So much for the technical problems. 4 Were countries really
ready to accept the implications of these suggestions put forward
by the technicians? Not only for the countries in surplus, but for
the United States and for the many countries in deficit (even
before the oil crisis of 1973-74), the reform initiatives contemplated an expansion of the international community's jurisdiction
over internal affairs-a scope of jurisdiction well in excess of anything heretofore known. Whereas previously a country could avoid
international jurisdiction (to use the lawyers' term) simply by not
invoking it, now objective measurements-changes in the flow or
stock of reserves-would set international scrutiny and "pressures"
in motion. One might talk about reserve indicators and asset settlement, words understood only by the technocrats and a few academics, but if deviations from a norm were required to be kept
within a stated range or else, there would really be Rules of the
Game. And the game would involve quite directly the major issues
about which elections are fought in democratic states-target rates
of growth and inflation, budgetary deficits, interest rates, perhaps
the ratio of exports to domestic consumption, and so on.
There could, of course, be some variation. Xandia, a deficit
country, might be told to reduce government expenditures, for instance, but not whether the reduction should be in veterans' benefits, medical care, or higher education. Patria, a surplus country,
"These "pressures" were set out in the Committee of Twenty's Outline of Reform, in
C-20 DocuMENTs, supra note 49, at 7, 28-30. They are spelled out somewhat further in Report of Technical Group on Adjustment, in C-20 DocumlsNTs, supra note 49, at 141, 153-56.
The effect of publication in this form was to "record the state of the discussion," Outline of
Reform, in C-20 DocuMENTs, supra note 49, at 7, 23, without committing the members of
the Committee of Twenty (let alone the members' governments) to the propositions stated.
The technical questions of definition, measurement, and application are necessarily
compressed in this brief review. Dam explains them in a plausible and comprehensible way,
the conclusion being that although the details are by no means trivial, they are not so difficult as to defy solution. See K. DAm, supra note 3, at 221-35. For the principal report and
annexes, but not the reports of the technical groups, see A. LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at
527-82.
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might be told to increase its overseas expenditures, but not
whether these increases should be in foreign aid, increased imports, or more direct foreign investment. Still, carried by the wave
of understanding that (whether exchange rates were fixed, adjustable, or floating) there is no wall of separation between domestic
and international economic phenomena, what started out as 55
a
system
prior
the
of
asymmetry
the
of
criticism
clearly correct
grew, in the technical discussions, into an expansion of international jurisdiction beyond the capacity of the world to accept-at
least up to now.
I think Dam would agree with the preceding discussion,
though he does not present it quite that way. He does discuss in
some detail the issue of sanctions and pressures,5" and in particular
whether they should be applied automatically on the happening of
a stated event, or by affirmative political decision, or semiautomatically (i.e., on the happening of a stated event unless the competent body voted otherwise within x days). The technical debates on
that subject-as on others-were to some extent a smoke screen
for the fundamental issue of how much states were prepared to
submit their internal economic policies to man-made international
controls. When early in 1974 the Committee of Twenty in effect
gave up its efforts to achieve comprehensive reform, "in the light
of the recent developments in the world economy [read the OPEC
coup]," 5 and began to shift to priorities for an interim regime, the
prospects of change in the international monetary system by an act
of creation5 8 disappeared. The vision of a reform system-i.e., a
system that owed its structure to a conscious legislative act-was
transformed into an indication of the "general direction in which
the Committee
believes that the system could evolve in the
5' 9
future.

51 I say the criticism is clearly correct, as far as it went; others have pointed out that
there were really two asymmetries, and that the American proposals did not address the
second one-the asymmetry between reserve centers (e.g., the United States) and other
countries. See, e.g., Williamson, The Failureof World Monetary Reform: A Reassessment,
in THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM UNDER FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES 297, 304 (M.
Cooper, P. Kenen, J. Braga de Macedo & J. van Ypersele eds. 1982).
" K. DAM, supra note 3, at 231-35.
" Communiqu6 of Committee of Twenty (January 18, 1974) 1 3, in C-20 DocUMENTS,
supra note 49, at 216, 217-18.
58 See the remark of Keynes quoted supra note 47.
5 Outline of Reform, in C-20 DocUMENTs, supra note 49, at 7, 7; see also id. at 18-19.
Professor Dam quotes R. SOLOMON, supra note 7, at 262, in attributing the changed formulation to Paul Volcker, at the time Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs and
one of the U.S. representatives on the Committee of Twenty's Committee of Deputies. K.
DAM, supra note 3, at 221.
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IV
The monetary system did of course evolve and continues to do
so. The direction of that evolution, from the mid-1970's to the date
of the manuscript (early 1981), and a look ahead form the last two
chapters of Dam's volume.
First came the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, e0 negotiated in outline by the major powers in
197561 and in detail at a meeting of the so-called Interim Committee in Jamaica in January 1976.2 The economists who had hoped
that their ideas might finally be translated into law treated the
Second Amendment as a failure-simply an adaptation of the legal
regime to the actual state of affairs (particularly with regard to
floating exchange rates) and not in any real sense a cure or even a
prescription for a cure of the system's ills.63 Dam is kinder. For one
thing, he regards as more significant than do the economists the
delegation of various authorities to the Fund itself,"4 so that if further agreements are reached-for instance on a return to fixed exchange rates or on changing the characteristics of Special Drawing
Rights-they can be implemented without need to resort once
more to the ponderous process of treaty amendment.6 5 For an£0 Second Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
April 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 [hereinafter cited as Amended Articles of
Agreement].
61In view of his current prominence, it is interesting that George Shultz, by then a
private citizen, was dispatched by President Ford in September 1975 to meet informally
(and secretly) with Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing (both former Finance Ministers) as well as with Prime Minister Wilson on a kind of advance mission to see
whether agreement among the major powers on the outstanding monetary issues seemed
feasible. The positive indications from that mission paved the way for what became the
crucial Rambouillet summit conference in November 1975 that formed the basis for the
Jamaica conference in January 1976. See G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, supra note 38, at 12-14.
:2 Following acceptance of the amendments at Jamaica and some further drafting, they
were approved by the Executive Directors of the Fund on March 31, 1976, see Executive
Directors Complete Amendment, Request Mail Vote by Board of Governors, 5 IMF SmV.
113, 113 (1976), and by the Board of Governors of the Fund by mail vote on April 30, 1976.
The Second Amendment formally entered into effect on April 1, 1978, following deposit of
instruments of ratification by 85 countries, having 78.52% of the total of the quotas of the
Fund. See Second Amendment in Force, Quotas to Rise, 7 IMF SURV.97, 97-98 (1978).
63 See, e.g., Machlup, Between Outline and Outcome Reform Was Lost, in REFLECTIONS
ON JAMAICA 30 (Princeton University, Essays in International Finance No. 115, 1976); Triffin, Jamaica: "Major Revision" or Fiasco?, in REFLECTIONS ON JAMAICA, supra, at 45. Of
Article IV ("Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements"), for example, Triffin wrote,
"Frankly, I find this text more worthy of a slapstick comedy than of a solemn treaty defining a new international monetary system." Id. at 47.
" K. DAM, supra note 3, at 259.
For examples of these delegations, each requiring a supermajority vote, see Amended
Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. IV, § 4, 29 U.S.T. at 2209 ("Fund may determine,
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other, he treats with a good deal of care the provisions of new article IV of the IMF Agreement, which replaced the commitment to
par values in the original Articles of Agreement."
Article IV, section 1, provides that
each member shall
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly economic
growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to
its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic
disruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates of the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with undertakings under this Section. 7
Further, article IV, section 3, provides that "[t]he Fund shall oversee the international monetary system," including "the compliance
of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article." ' Does this constitute recognition of the international jurisdiction talked about in the Committee of Twenty, minus the "pressures"? 9 The first decision of the Executive Directors of the Fund
in implementation of article IV, the Decision on Surveillance over
Exchange Rate Policies, 70 would lead one to think not, for it is addressed almost entirely to exchange-rate policies. Yet it does men-

by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power, that international economic

conditions permit the introduction of.

.

.exchange arrangements based on stable but ad-

justable par values"), art. XIX, § 2(c), 29 U.S.T. at 2243 ("Fund, by a seventy percent ma-

jority of the total voting power, may prescribe [SDR-based] operations in which a participant is authorized to engage in agreement with another participant"), art. XIX, § 6(b), 29
U.S.T. at 2245 ("A seventy percent majority of the total voting power shall be required for

decisions to adopt, modify, or abrogate the rules for reconstitution [of SDR holdings].").
" K. DAM, supra note 3, at 256-67.
:7
OS

Amended Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. IV, § 1, 29 U.S.T. at 2208.
Id. art. IV, § 3, 29 U.S.T. at 2209.

" Professor Triffin, perhaps the world's leading international monetary economist,
wrote, "[tihe only obligations I can find.., are so general and obvious as to appear largely

superfluous." Triffin, supra note 63, at 47.
7' IMF Executive Directors Decision No. 5392-(77/93) (April 29, 1977), in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 10.
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tion domestic policies of member states,7 1 and one could build on
that if the collective will were there.
Having last looked into this question myself in 1977, just after
the Decision on Surveillance was issued, 2 I had hoped to learn
from Professor Dam what the experience had been in the first four
years of the Jamaica regime. Dam notes (as I did in 1977) the
American preference for common law, as expressed in various
statements by William Simon, who had succeeded Shultz as U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury, and the European preference for a code
of conduct, as expressed by the Managing Director of the Fund,
Johannes Witteveen.7 3 The trouble with a common-law approach,

however, is that so long as the Fund keeps its practice secret, as
most governments desire, it will be very hard for a body of precedents to be built up, except perhaps in the minds of a few permanent members of the IMF staff. Professor Dam, out of government
for the relevant period, has the same thirst for knowledge that I
do, but it remains unsatisfied:
[I]t is difficult in retrospect to determine which side [common
law or code] won. The specific principles in the surveillance
decision were not much more specific than those in the Articles of Agreement themselves, and yet, since the results of
consultations are not made public, it is impossible to know
whether those principles have been given any more definite
content. Certainly unless consultations have produced new
principles that then bind members in later consultations,
nothing that a lawyer would recognize as a "common law" approach can be identified. 4
I suppose that with Dam's support and the IMF Decision as
authority, some kind of "law" may be stated-even "restated."
Carrying on the Restatement's role as a kind of bridge between a
71 Id. at 11 ("it is recognized that there is a close relationship between domestic and
international economic policies"). See also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
7' See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 15, at 214-15. For a thorough discussion of the prob-

lem, written before any experience could be accumulated, see Edwards, The Currency Exchange Rate Provisions of the Proposed Amended Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 722 (1976).

7' See K. DAM, supra note 3, at 260 and sources cited; A.

LOWENFELD,

supra note 15, at

213-14.
74 K. DAM, supra note 3, at 260. Recent annual reports of the Fund have contained
reviews of the experience with surveillance, see, e.g., IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 1980, at 52-58

(1980); IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 1981, at 61-62 (1981); IMF, ANNUAL REPORT 1982, at 56-58

(1982), but unless one knows how to read between the lines much better than either Professor Dam or this reviewer, they shed very little light on the questions raised.
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case system and a code system, I may be able to come up with a
"black-letter" rule something like the following:
Member states of the International Monetary Fund
(1) may not manipulate exchange rates in order to prevent effective balance of payment adjustment or to gain
unfair advantage over other members;
(2) should intervene in the exchange market if necessary to counter disorderly conditions in the exchange
value of its currency; and
(3) should take into account in their intervention policies the interests of other member states.75
But could one do more that that? For example, could one state in
black-letter law (or even in a normative comment) that member
states are obligated to take into account in their overall
macroeconomic policies the interests of other member states? This
is a good deal more problematical. For instance, could a rule of
international law obligate the United States, in determining its
own central bank discount rate, to take into account the interests
of Canada? Indeed, does the United States, because of its size and
the role of the dollar as the major reserve and transaction currency, have an obligation to consider the interests of, and consult
with, virtually all member states, whereas, say, Ecuador has a duty
to consider at most the interests of Bolivia and Peru? And if there
is no obligation to prepare the monetary version of an environmental impact statement, is it at least open (a) to Canada or France, or
(b) to the Managing Director of the IMF to initiate a "consultation" with the United States about its policies concerning interest
7
rates or fiscal policy or inflation? 1
The Decision on Surveillance says that once a consultation is
initiated, the Fund's appraisal of a member's exchange rate poli71

I hasten to state that the above is a condensed paraphrase of operative paragraphs A,

B, and C of the Decision on Surveillance, see supra note 70 and accompanying text, and
only a first draft of what might go into the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (Revised), to be published in Tentative Draft No. 5 in the spring of 1984.
74 It is interesting that after relatively limited exchange market activity in the last
years of the Ford administration and the first year and a half of the Carter administration,
the United States in November 1978 initiated a policy of high-volume, day-to-day intervention in exchange markets, including the acquisition of substantial foreign currency reserves.
When the Reagan administration entered office, the United States changed its policy again,
intervening only to counter conditions of severe disorder in the market, see EcONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 172-73, 189-91 (1982), such as that which existed after the attempt
on President Reagan's life in March 1981. Whether these changes reflected any constraint or
"consultation" on the part of the IMF or only different political/economic outlooks of sev-

eral administrations within the wide band of internationally acceptable conduct is not clear.
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cies "shall be made within the framework of a comprehensive analysis of the ... economic policy strategy of the member, and shall

recognize that domestic as well as external policies can contribute
'
to timely adjustment of the balance of payments." 7

It seems that initiating a consultation on a basis other than
the member's activity concerning exchange rates is not permitted,
though if that jurisdictional prerequisite is present, the scrutiny of
effects on other members may go beyond exchange rates.78 But assuming the jurisdictional prerequisite has been met and a consultation has been properly initiated, may that consultation go beyond
exchange-rate practices and include the economic policies of the
member state that is the subject of the consultations? Dam urges
an affirmative answer to that question, "for if surveillance is to be
effective, it must be concerned with domestic policies that generate
inflation and thereby domestic instability. 7

9

"Indeed," he argues,

"it would be a denial of the fundamental shift in priorities between
Bretton Woods and Jamaica, from exchange rate stability to domestic stability, to foreclose inquiry into domestic policies in the
surveillance process."80 But he has no precedents and he is not
optimistic. "The carrot of Fund financial assistance," he concludes,
"is likely to be more influential than the stick of Fund
surveillance."81
7' IMF Executive Directors Decision No. 5392-(77/63) (April 29, 1977), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 27, at 10, 13, quoted in K. DAM, supra note 3, at 266.
78 This seems confirmed by a supplemental decision that provides that "[w]henever the

Managing Director considers that a modification in a member's exchange arrangements or
exchange rate policies or the behavior of the exchange rate of its currency may be important
or may have important effects on other members.., he shall initiate informally and confidentially a discussion with the member." IMF Executive Directors Decision No. 6026-(79/
13) (January 22, 1979), SELECTED DECISIONs, supra note 27, at 15, 15. In other words, the
latter decision permits a discussion to be initiated by the Managing Director without any
finding of departure from the "black-letter" rules, but a change in the member's exchange
rate practice remains the trigger.
11 K. DAM, supra note 3, at 267.
8o Id. Anthony M. Solomon, Undersecretary of the Treasury during most of the Carter
administration and currently President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, carried
this approach forward in a recent speech. The carrot for participation in more meaningful
surveillance by the Fund would be greater availability of funds for Patria in the first and
second credit tranches for Fund drawings, i.e., more money with less stringent conditions.
The stick would be the announcement, in some form, that if Xandia declines the Fund's
invitation to participate in consultations or to follow through on them, there will follow at
least a yellow light for prospective lenders. See A. Solomon, Restoring Balance in an Interdependent World, Remarks before Bicentennial Financial Symposium, New York (Oct. 7,
1982).
81K. DAM, supra note 3, at 267. Note (as Dam does, id. at 266-67) that the amended
articles state that "[t]hese principles [of surveillance] shall respect the domestic social and
political policies of members." Amended Articles of Agreement, supra note 60, art. IV, §
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Even the carrot, however, may not be particularly effective. As
Dam observes in his final chapter, the conditions for conditionality
continue to be loosened by availability of alternative resources,
particularly to developing countries.82 As an observation, that is
certainly correct; as a prediction of a continuing trend, it is hard to
tell. It was hard to predict, even as late as the Jamaica Agreement
of 1976, how great would be the availability of credit from nonofficial sources, as the private banking sector turned petrodollars into
Eurodollars and re-lent them to governments on a massive scale,
usually without conditions or performance criteria. 83 As concern
has mounted since 1981 over the creditworthiness of the sovereign
borrowers-first Poland, then Mexico, tomorrow perhaps Argentina or Brazil-it may be that an IMF standby will become a requirement for private sector loans or rescheduling of existing
debt.8 4 If that happens, the Rules of the Game-that is, the old

3(b), 29 U.S.T. at 2209. Dam would argue, I believe, that "respect" means that the Fund is
not supposed to tell a socialist country to be capitalist, or vice-versa, not that the Fund
must close its eyes to the country's particular economic measures.
"I K. DAM, supra note 3, at 296.
s' As of the close of 1980, the total outstanding, long-term debt of developing countries
without significant oil reserves stood at $370.1 billion, compared with $97.3 billion in 1973.
Of these amounts, official institutions accounted for $49.1 billion in 1973, or about 50%; by
1980, official institutions accounted for $155.8 billion, or 42%. See IMF, ANNUAL REPORT
1981, at 34 (1981) (Table 12). By 1982, the total debt stood at $505 billion, of which over
60% was held by U.S. and foreign private creditors. See IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
170 (1982) (Table 30).
" The announcement on December 23, 1982, of the IMF credit of SDR 3.6 billion
(equal to about U.S. $3.94 billion) to Mexico, see Mexico to Use Resources from Fund to
Support Major Adjustment Effort, 12 IMF SuRv. 1 (1983), discloses a new and apparently
close working relationship between the Fund and private-sector banks. The announcement
reflects detailed negotiations concerning Mexico's future economic policies, including major
reductions in public sector deficits, tight monetary policies, flexible exchange rate policies,
and stringent reductions in the rate of inflation, in line with past IMF prescriptions. Further, the announcement states:
The advisory group of [private] bankers has informed the Managing Director that the
responses to date to the request concerning the needed financing from the international
banking community have been highly positive and that these responses demonstrate
the intention of the commercial banks to do their part. On the basis of this direct
survey of commitments of the commercial banks made by the advisory group, the Managing Director concluded that there was sufficient assurance that the needed amounts
were being made available to justify his recommendation to the Fund's Executive
Board that it could approve the proposed arrangement with the expectations that it
was being adequately financed to support the policies of the Mexican authorities.
Id. at 3.
The New York Times reported that Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, was supporting the IMF in initiatives such as the massive credit to Mexico by "brush[ing] aside" some regulatory obstacles that might have inhibited cooperation of the U.S. commercial banks in the Mexican rescue effort. Farnsworth, A
Dramatic Change at the I.M.F., N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983, at F1, col. 2, F10, cols. 2-3.
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rules of conditionality-will regain some of their importance. Not

Jamaica, reflecting the frustrated movement for reform, but Bretton Woods, having passed through several stages of evolution, will
become relevant once again; the earlier question of conditional
drawings versus drawings as of right8 5 will once more be critical.
What then is the law that informs the conditionality imposed
by the Fund? Is it simply a kind of common law of tort: "do not
hurt they neighbor"? Or is there a law of nature that gives content
to the order, "do what is economically sound"? I think that question is implicit in the question with which Dam ends his book.
"The question is thus not whether reform or evolution will be chosen but where the balance will be." 6 His hunch is that reform will
turn out to have less economic substance than will evolution, but
that progress along either path is likely to involve new levels of
complexity in legal rules.8 7 I am not sure whether to be encouraged
or discouraged by that prediction.
V
There is much more to this rich and thoughtful book than the
themes followed in this review. Dam omits some topics about
which I would have liked to learn from him-for instance, the criteria of the Fund in approving (or at least declining to disapprove)
the growing web of exchange controls, among developed as well as
developing countries. But he does pay continuing attention to the
role of gold-past, present, and future; s to Special Drawing Rights
from their birth in 1968 to their adolescence in the 1980's with
some of the "barnacles" (in Dam's phrase) removed;89 and to prospects for the composition and use of reserves, whether by design or
by the forces of nature.9 0 Also, Dam has a brief but illuminating
discussion of the pros and cons of regulation by national authorities of off-shore banking, concluding that neither a territorial nor
an extraterritorial (domiciliary) approach to regulation of branch
banking would work unless everybody-notably including Great
Britain and Switzerland-went along.91 He regards the prospects
of agreement on that subject as dim,92 though (I think) in the long
85See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
88 K. DAm, supra note 3, at 342.
87

Id.

" See, e.g., id. at 14-40, 54-60, 246-47, 269-75, 336-41.
59 Id. at 276; see also id. at 275-81.
"See, e.g., id. at 314-20.
" Id.
at 320-28.
" Id.
at 324-26.
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run desirable. Dam also gives a quite lucid account of the European Monetary System-a mini-Bretton Woods including some
(though not all) of the members of the European Economic Community." I refrain from summarizing this discussion here because I
suspect that as these lines are written (Autumn 1982) the rules of
that game are changing, if indeed the game continues past the date
of publication. 4
The big game, however, will clearly go on. As John Williamson, a leading scholar on international monetary matters and one
of the IMF's representatives at the Committee of Twenty, recently
wrote, "an individual country may be able to decelerate inflation
without much loss in real income by varying the fiscal-monetary
mix so that its currency appreciates, [but] this is not an option for
a closed system, such as the world." 5

13 Id. at 328-36.

" See, e.g., Rattling Snake, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18-24 (1982), at 84.
n Williamson, supra note 55, at 298.

